

# Efficient Template Attacks

## CARDIS 2013

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  - Efficient implementation  
(reducing evaluation time, e.g. from 3 days to 30 minutes)


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  - Efficient implementation  
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  - Fair evaluation of most common compression techniques
    - Show several assumptions do not hold in general
    - Practical guideline for choosing the right compression

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    - Show several assumptions do not hold in general
    - Practical guideline for choosing the right compression
  - And ... we provide data and code so you can try it!



# Experiment: eavesdropping on 8-bit data bus



## Executed Code:


```

movw r30, r24
ld r8, Z+
ld r9, Z+
ld r10, Z+
ld r11, Z+
  
```







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
```

movw r30, r24
ld r8, 0
ld r9, k
ld r10, 0
ld r11, 0
  
```




# Profiling: Acquire Traces

$k = 0$



$k = 1$



$\vdots$

$k = 255$

## Executed Code:

```
movw r30, r24
```


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```

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

# Profiling: Estimate Templates



# Attack: using the multivariate normal distribution

$$d(k | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^m |\mathbf{S}_k|}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_k^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)\right)$$

$$k^* \rightarrow \operatorname{argmax}_k d(k | \mathbf{x})$$



# Problem 1: Floating point issues

$$d(k | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^m |\mathbf{S}_k|}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_k^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)\right)$$

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
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- Issue 1:  $\exp(x)$  is only safe for  $|x| < 710$ , which is easily exceeded in our experiments.
- Issue 2:  $|\mathbf{S}_k|$  can overflow/underflow easily for large  $m$  ( $> 50$ ).


These are *real* problems. Naive implementations are likely to fail.

# Solution: use LOG


$$d_{\text{LOG}}(k | \mathbf{x}) = -\frac{m}{2} \log 2\pi - \frac{1}{2} \log |\mathbf{S}_k| - \frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_k^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)$$



log





# Caveat: pdf can be larger than 1




“[Choose the candidate  $k$  that leads to the] *smallest* **absolute value** [of  $d_{\text{LOG}}$ ]”

[Mangard, Oswald, Popp '07]





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

“[Choose the candidate  $k$  that leads to the] *smallest* **absolute value** [of  $d_{\text{LOG}}$ ]”

**Incorrect:**

log is monotonic, abs is not!

We choose  $k$  with *highest* value of  $d_{\text{LOG}}$ .

[Mangard, Oswald, Popp '07]



## Problem 2: dealing with large number of samples

- Myth: problems with inversion of  $\mathbf{S}_k$  as soon as  $m$  is large.

$m$  = number of samples

$n_p$  = number of traces from profiling, for each  $k$

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- Clarification:
  - $n_p \leq m$ :  $\mathbf{S}_k$  cannot be inverted ( $\text{rank}(\mathbf{S}_k) < n_p$ )

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
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  - $n_p > m$ :  $\mathbf{S}_k$  will most likely be invertible (ignoring highly correlated samples)
- Problem: obtaining  $n_p > m$  can be difficult due to memory and time constraints.


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
# Scenario 1: $S_k$ dependent on $k$



## Scenario 2: $S_k$ independent on $k$



# Efficient solution: use $\mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}$



- $\mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}$  is an average of the covariances.
- $\mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}$  uses  $|\mathcal{S}|n_p$  traces, while  $\mathbf{S}_k$  only  $n_p$ .
- Now the condition for non-singularity is  $n_p > \frac{m}{|\mathcal{S}|}$ 
  - A great advantage in practice.



# Mahalanobis Distance

$$d(k | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^m |\mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}|}} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k) \right)$$

# Mahalanobis Distance

$$d_{\text{MD}}(k | \mathbf{x}) = -\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)$$

Still not optimal:  
quadratic in  $\mathbf{x}$

$$d_{\text{MD}} \approx \sum_i \sum_j s_{ij} x_i x_j$$

# Combining traces for $n_a > 1$

$$d_{\text{MD}}^{\text{joint}}(k \mid \mathbf{X}_{k^*}) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbf{X}_{k^*}} (\mathbf{x}_i - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}_k^{-1} (\mathbf{x}_i - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)$$

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- Computation of MD:  $O(m^3)$
- Total computation:  $O(n_a m^3)$ 
  - Not good for large  $m$
  - 3 days for  $m = 125, n_a = 1000$

$n_a$  = number of traces used in attack


# Linear Discriminant

$$d_{\text{LINEAR}}^{\text{joint}}(k | \mathbf{X}_{k^*}) = \bar{\mathbf{x}}'_k \mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}^{-1} \left( \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbf{X}_{k^*}} \mathbf{x}_i \right) - \frac{n_a}{2} \bar{\mathbf{x}}'_k \mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}}^{-1} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k$$


Computation in  $O(n_a + m^3)$

- Much better than  $d_{\text{MD}}^{\text{joint}}$ :  $O(n_a m^3)$
- In practice: for  $m = 125$ ,  $n_a = 1000$ 
  - $d_{\text{MD}}^{\text{joint}}$  needs 3 *days*
  - $d_{\text{LINEAR}}^{\text{joint}}$  only 30 *minutes*

# Compression Methods



# Compression Methods: Sample Selection




Myth: *“Additional samples per clock do not provide additional information”* [Rechberger, Oswald '05]

- 1ppc: 1 point per clock [Rechberger, Oswald '05]
- 3ppc (20 samples)
- 20ppc (70 samples)
- allap (125 samples)




# Compression Methods: PCA



$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{X}_0^r \\ \mathbf{X}_1^r \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{X}_{255}^r \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_0 \\ \bar{\mathbf{x}}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{255} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \text{PCA} \rightarrow \mathbf{U}$$

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
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[Archambeau et al. '06]

$$\mathbf{U}' \quad \mathbf{S}_k^r \quad \mathbf{U} = \quad \mathbf{S}_k$$

(large  $m$ )                      (small  $m$ )

# Compression Methods: PCA



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(large  $m$ )  (small  $m$ )

Our approach

1.  $\mathbf{X}_k^r \quad \mathbf{U} = \quad \mathbf{X}_k$   
(large  $m$ )  (small  $m$ )
2.  $\mathbf{S}_k = \text{Cov}(\mathbf{X}_k)$

# Compression Methods: LDA

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_0 \\ \bar{\mathbf{x}}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{255} \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{S}_{\text{pooled}} \rightarrow \text{LDA} \rightarrow \mathbf{U}$$

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[Standaert et al. '08]

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 (large  $m$ ) (small  $m$ )

Our approach:  $\mathbf{S}_k = \mathbf{I}$  (we can ignore it, while using all information!)

# Evaluation by *Guessing Entropy*

- Sort candidates by decreasing score  $d(k | \mathbf{X}_{k^*})$

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 & & 1 \quad k = 74 \\
 & & 2 \quad k = 13 \\
 D_{k^*} & = & 3 \quad k = k^* = 9 \\
 & & \vdots \\
 \text{depth of correct } k & & \vdots \\
 & & 256 \quad k = 201
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- Compute average over all  $k^*$ :  $\bar{D}_{k^*}$



# Evaluation by *Guessing Entropy*





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
- Compute average over all  $k^*$ :  $\bar{D}_{k^*}$
- Guessing Entropy* =  $\log_2 \bar{D}_{k^*}$

Estimates the remaining *key strength* in targeted brute force search that tries most likely candidates first


## Results



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
 $S_{\text{pooled}}, n_p = 200$ 


## Results

 $S_{\text{pooled}}, n_p = 2000$ 


# Practical Guideline

$$n_a = 1$$



# Practical Guideline

$$n_a = 1000$$



# Code and Data available

<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/datasets/grizzly/>

- Raw data used for all the results shown in the paper.
- MATLAB scripts to compute template attacks efficiently, including all the algorithms described in the paper.

# Conclusion

- Template Attacks can be much more efficient than we thought
  - Can use large number of samples
  - Evaluation time reduced from 3 days to 30 minutes
  - Explore this when using template attacks
  - Might influence CC Evaluation
- Be aware of incorrect assumptions/implementations  
⇒ Now you have our paper!
- Practical guideline for choosing the right compression method
- Now you have data and code to implement efficient template attacks



# Questions?

Omar Choudary: [omar.choudary@cl.cam.ac.uk](mailto:omar.choudary@cl.cam.ac.uk)

Markus G. Kuhn: [markus.kuhn@cl.cam.ac.uk](mailto:markus.kuhn@cl.cam.ac.uk)